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RECENT CASES

necessitated strict proof of the averment.5 Apparently, one
of the reasons for requiring strict proof of the fact was to
make certain the accusation against a defendant so that he
might prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.6 It is said
that: "If a necessary allegation is made unnecessarily minute
in description, the proof must satisfy the descriptive as well
as the main part, since the one is essential to the identity of
the other."'
Some jurisdictions have weakened the effect of the exacting
common law rule. 8 An early Illinois case stated that the
office of a videlicet is "to indicate that the party does not
undertake to prove the precise circumstances as alleged." 9
It should be noted, however, that in a later case the Illinois
Supreme Court declared that proof is required if the matter
laid under the videlicet is materialto the charge.10 A requirement of proof when the allegation under a videlicet is material
appears to be a clearly establish rule." When the fact alleged
2
is not material, it is generally treated as surplusage.1
The court in the instant case relied on a Dakota Territory
case which suggested that an allegation of "kind" is material
if "descriptive of the identity of the subject of the action."' 3
Admittedly, the allegation of Stillbrook whiskey was descriptive and made specific that which before was general. However, it is submitted that the allegation is not material to the
offense charged, the statutory offense of selling "any intoxicating liquor" to a minor.
MAURICE R. HUNKE

INTERNAL REVENUE BUSINESS BAD DEBTS -

INCOME TAX BUSINESS OR NONSCOPE OF "TRADE OR BUSINESS" -

5. State v. Scovill, 15 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. 1929).
6. See, e.g., McLendon v. State, 121 Ga. 158, 48 S.E. 902 (1904); State
v. Sinnott, 72 S.D. 100, 30 N.W.2d 455 (1947).
7. 2 BISHOP'S NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 485(2) (2d ed. 1913).
8. See, e.g., Columbian Three Color Co. v. Aneta Life Ins. Co., 183 Ill.
App. 384 (1913); State v. Heck, 23 Minn. 549 (1877); Culp v. Virginian Ry.
80 'A. Va. 98, 92 S.E. 236 (1917).
9. Chicago Terminal Transfer R.R. v. Young, 118 Ill. App. 226, 229
(1905).
10. People v. McCanney, 205 Ill. App. 91, 98 (1917):
11. See, e.g., cases cited in note 8, supra.
12. See, e.g., Tullis v. Shaw, 169 Ind. 662, 83 N.E. 376 (1908).
13. Brugier v. United States, 1 Dak. 5, 46 N.W. 502 (1867).
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The petitioner was employed by the debtor company. The
employment was conditioned by the fact that the petitioner
was expected to make loans to the company until the company's
cash condition improved. Pursuant to this agreement the
petitioner made such loans which were never completely repaid. His employment was terminated when he refused to
make further loans. When the company became insolvent
petitioner sought to deduct the amount of the worthless advances as a business bad debt. The United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, held without dissent that the unpaid
debts would be fully deductible as a business bad debt, stating
that they were made in the scope of "trade or business,"
which term included all means of making a living, even those
which "would scarcely be so characterized in common speech."
Trent v. C. I. R., 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
The treatment of bad debts and losses for income tax purposes is dependent on whether or not the debt or loss is incurred as an incident of business or nonbusiness.' If a bad debt
or loss may be attributed to one's business 2 such debt or loss
is deductible from that party's gross income in full.' On the
other hand, a nonbusiness 4 bad debt or loss is treated as a
loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held less than
six months. 5 In other words, the nonbusiness bad debt or
loss is treated as a "Short Term Capital Loss". 6 When subjected to this treatment, the taxpayer is not necessarily allowed a full deduction of the loss.7
The terms "trade" and "business" have been held to be
synonymous. 8 A 1939 case defined the term "business" as
embracing every area in which a person can be employed for
gain or profit.9 It must be noted, however, that earlier cases
have held the term "profit" alone as too restrictive, stating
that the proper test is whether or not an enterprise is carried
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(a), 'd).
1.
2. See Gray v. Board of County Comm'rs. of Sedgwick County, 101 Kan.
195, 165 Pac. 867, 868 (1917).
3. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(a)(1).
4. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d)(2).
5. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d)(1)(B).
6. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(2).
7. See Fed. Tax Reg. §§ 1.166-5, 1.1222-1 (1962).
8. See Gray v. Board of County Comm'rs. of Sedgwick County, 101 Kan.
195, 165 Pac. 867, 868 (1917).
9. Cecil. v. C.I.R., 100 F.2d 8'96 (4th Cir. 1939).
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on in good faith with the intention to make a profit. 10 Another
case has held that the term ."carrying on any trade or business"
is to be construed by the popular import given to these words.",
Decisions in the area of whether or not an activity is business or nonbusiness requires an examination of the facts in
each case, since the element of the intent of the taxpayer is
of importance.12 In Morton v. C. I. R. the taxpayer attempted
to deduct the expenses incurred on a farm where he and his
family resided. The court held that the intent of the taxpayer
to convert the farm to an income producing purpose was the
important element, and denied the deduction when it concluded that no such intent existed.
Thus, a careful scrutiny of the case law and various factual
situations may enable the attorney to cause his client's losses
to fall within the scope of "trade or business". By constant
attention to the new development of the broadening of the
areas of definition perhaps the taxpayer may at least receive
the benefit of the doubt in close cases.
MAURICE E. COOK

MAY A
MODE OF VOTING ENACTMENT STATUTES LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR GIVE THE "CASTING VOTE" IN A STATE

LEGISLATURE? -

A bill was presented to the Montana State

Senate which would raise the fee for a drivers license from $3
to $4. A vote was taken which resulted in a tie. The Lieutenant Governor cast the tie breaking vote. The Supreme
Court of Montana held that the power vested in the Lieutenant Governor to give the "casting vote" when the Senate is
equally divided vests in the Lieutenant Governor alone, and
such vote is to be counted, and when counted, it determines the
fate of the bill or proposition being voted on and produces
"a majority vote of all the members" in the Senate. State v.
Highway Patrol Board, 372 P.2d 930 (Mont. 1962).
In arriving at this result the court was compelled to dis10. Wallace's Estate v. C.I.R., 101 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1939); Doggett v.
Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 194, (D.C. Cir. 1933).
11. Higgins v. C.I.R., 111 F.2d 795 (2nd Cir. 1940). This case held that
expenses incurred while protecting one's own investments was not acting
within the scope of trade or business.
12. Morton v. C.I.R., 174 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1949).

